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EMO

NATIONAL DIGEST

Reflections on Civil Defence and Survival

Saskatchewan EMO

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British Home Defence Review

In Peace Time as in War

Saudi Arabia Civil Defence

No Public Clamor

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Director General: C. R. PATTERSON *Editor:* A. M. STIRTON

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REFLECTIONS ON CIVIL DEFENCE AND SURVIVAL

by Wing Commander Sir John Hodsoll, C.B.

Sir John Hodsoll has compiled in twenty chapters his personal views on the important things which should and need to be done to develop a healthy civil emergency programme. The Canada Emergency Measures Organization is indebted to Sir John for his permission to reproduce his material in the EMO National Digest. It is being reproduced in serial form. Chapters 1 to 5 appear in this issue. The remaining chapters will be published in subsequent editions.

Introduction

I have attempted to set out in this book, in broad outline, how I think the Home Front might be organized to meet nuclear attack. I have laid particular stress on the international aspects of this problem because I believe that, even with a country of the size and resources of the United States, it is essential that this menace is met by an Alliance. Certainly with smaller countries, this will be their chief hope of survival.

I have tried to face up to the facts as I see them and have proposed what I have called a *Survival Plan*. In other words, I have suggested that defence should be concentrated where it is most likely to be effective, and that time and money should not be wasted in trying to defend undefendable areas and places.

The essence of the plan is the saving of life; and the organization of a country in such a way as would seem, not only to offer the best chances of survival, but of providing bases from which to fight back after the attacks are over. The whole conception is based on the analogy of creating a series of fortresses, designed to withstand a state of seige and providing for the garrisons to sally forth as soon as the seige can be raised, that is, when the attacks have ceased and the fallout situation has been assessed.

I have laid emphasis on the time factors and the vital importance of using any breathing space, during a period of tension, to take action which will be impossible if left till the attacks have started. I realise that, politically, my suggestions raise considerable difficulties; but it seems to me that, whatever may happen in a war with the Communist Countries, we shall inevitably be accused of aggression. If peace is going to be kept it is by strength and not weakness; and that is why I have stressed strongly that part of this strength must lie in the readiness of the Home Front.

I have also put particular emphasis on the role of the population, who must learn to help themselves and be mentally and physically prepared for a drastic readjustment of their lives to meet the crisis with which they might be faced. At all costs they must be strengthened to resist threats. An unprepared population might force their Government to accept almost any terms and could prove to be the Achilles heel of a country and indeed of an alliance. Above all, the idea that there is nothing to be done, must be counteracted.

Although the effects of a nuclear war would be devastating, I firmly believe that survival is possible if the proper precautions are taken and we are not afaid to face up to conditions which might be primitive for a time but need not be unsupportable for all that.

A lesser threat could be met by adjusting the measures proposed.

I realize that the drastic suggestions put forward are controversial but I hope they are realistic and may, at least, provoke some thought. Experience in the last war will certainly be a help but we must re-adjust a lot of our thinking if we are successfully to resist the greatest threat so far to our existence.

There is not very much literature on this vital subject of the Defence of the Home Front and I hope this book will make some contribution to the solution of problems, which however unpleasant, have got to be faced. It is based on over thirty years' experience, both national and international. I do not claim that there is anything very new; rather it is a summary of practical knowledge with some attempt to apply it to the problems of the future.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Wing Commander Sir John Hodsoll, C.B., was formerly Director General of Civil Defence in the United Kingdom, and head of Civil Defence in NATO. Sir John's experience in civil defence goes back to 1922 when he was appointed secretary of the United Kingdom's Government Committee on Air Raid Precautions. After roughly 40 years' experience in civil defence he is now living in retirement.

Of particular interest to Canadians is the fact that on many occasions from 1949 to 1958 he acted as adviser to Canadian authorities, and to some extent was instrumental in the founding of the Canadian Civil Defence College, now the Canadian Emergency Measures College.

Chapter 1

Against what forms of attack should preparations be made?

The obvious answer to this question is a nuclear war. It is suggested that the answer is not quite so straightforward and the purpose of this chapter is to examine the various possibilities.

There exists a school of thought which holds the view that no country would be so mad as to start a nuclear war against another that had at least equal retaliatory power, unless they had some big surprise up their sleeves, which they believed would tip the scales so heavily in their favour as to neutralise their opponents before they could strike back. It seems unlikely that such a situation would arise though it would perhaps, be rash to rule out such a possibility completely.

Arguing, however, from this basis, the idea is then advanced that war would be of a "limited" character, implying a return to conventional weapons, with the use of tactical atomic or nuclear weapons being limited to the battlefield.

Another body of opinion, mainly American, has put forward the theory that, with the development of new chemical and biological weapons, there is no need to look any further for the most efficient way of waging war. If the object is not to kill people and cause widespread devastation, why not just immobilise them. In this way you could walk into a country and take possession without fighting; and by the time your opponent had "come to", it would be too late.

There are, as always, in considering problems of this kind a variety of possibilities and a conflict of informed opinion as to the most likely forms of attack to be used. On what basis should plans for defence be made and training carried out? Some decision must be taken, because it is clearly impossible to meet every contingency effectively, save by crippling financial expenditure, which added to other forms of active defence could only end in the disruption of a nation's economy.

This is no new problem, as it has always been necessary to crystal gaze in peacetime, using such information about any potential enemy's intentions and capabilities as is available. It is also of the utmost importance to study carefully the personalities and probable aims of those in control of the country and the influence which may bring pressure to bear on them for good or evil.

To assess correctly the form of attack against which to prepare, is a task which becomes more and more complicated with the rapid advances which science continues to make. There are also changing political situations, especially the upsurge of Afro-Asian strength and instability, and the other political cross currents, predictable and unpredictable, which do not help those who have to try to plot and steer a steady course. But reasonable assumptions must be made, and it need hardly be emphasized that radical changes cannot be introduced at frequent intervals without risk of disorganizing the whole defence system. There must be considerable flexibility in thinking and planning.

Up to the present, most Civil Emergency Planning has been based on the worst case, nuclear attack; it has been assumed that in so doing any lesser forms would be automatically covered. This is probably true, though if the lesser happened rather than the greater, some important adjustments would have to be made.

There are two notable exceptions, however, to this assumption; chemical and biological warfare. These forms of attack pose special problems which defence against other forms of attack does not adequately cover. These weapons can kill, immobilize and cause casualties; but the word immobilize has a special significance and means literally to put people completely out of action for a given period without necessarily leaving any ill effects afterwards. Respirators and gas-proof accommodation are essential elements in protection which are not necessary against other forms of attack. (Fallout is not at present a weapon per se.) So far both these weapons have received a low defence priority.

Historically, gas has not been used deliberately to attack the civil population, though they were affected in Italy's war against Abyssinia. It was essentially a military weapon in the 1914-18 war, which was abandoned once the main element of surprise had disappeared and protective measures became effective.

There is an obvious need to keep all planning assumptions under constant review; and to bear in mind that the nuclear threat is so great that it inevitably exercises a sort of mental hypnotism. In other words, there is a natural tendency for this form of attack to become an *idée fixe* and for other possibilities to be ignored.

Although most countries in NATO and the friendly neutrals are basing their plans on the same general assumptions, careful study will reveal a tendency probably inevitable, but dangerous nevertheless, to try and fit the anticipated scale and type of attack into the geographic, physical and economic features and capabilities of the country concerned. Up to a point, this is sensible, because each one has its own special problems, but beyond a certain point the result might be unfortunate.

There is another difficulty. Important parts of defence planning have to be based on the assumption that, if the population is told what to do and how to do it, it will, in peacetime, actively co-operate, but all experience goes to show that the majority, unless there is a real crisis, does not take much interest; furthermore most Governments are not prepared, for political reasons, to press the population very hard. And if the population is expected to put its hand in its own pocket

to help in its defence, the result is a foregone conclusion. This important problem is further discussed in a subsequent chapter.

It is quite clear that, so long as a threat of nuclear war remains, defences must be planned against it, as being the worst case. Preparations against this threat will certainly cover any lesser bombing, though tactical adjustments would be necessary, possibly on a considerable scale.

Perhaps, the most important thing is to avoid being surprised on a massive scale at the outset. We must be surprise conscious in our thinking and planning and be careful not to allow ourselves to imagine that because, traditionally, things have not happened or seem impossible or highly improbable, or even unthinkable, they can be ignored. These remarks are especially pertinent as regards biological and chemical warfare, which might well be used and could get under our guard in a most disastrous way.

In drawing up plans, the following assumptions must clearly be taken into account:

(*a*) In any future large scale or total war, the civil population and the economic life of the country will be attacked.

(*b*) Any such attacks may be made by nuclear, high explosive, incendiary, chemical or biological weapons possibly in one or more combinations. The methods of delivery can vary, but may include manned aircraft, missiles from submarines or ships or from on shore bases.

(*c*) The possibility of some weapon, at present unknown being invented cannot be ignored. It is only possible to plan against the known, as opposed to the unknown.

(*d*) Whatever weapons are used, it would seem highly probable that the attack will be delivered at maximum strength at the outset of hostilities.

It is important to appreciate that while civil defence services in most countries are being trained to meet nuclear attack, the civil populations are receiving little, if any training; although they are being exhorted hard in the United States and in Sweden, the organization is almost complete. The One in Five scheme of the Womens Voluntary Services in Britain is making good headway and is an excellent way of spreading education in self help.

In the broader field of civil planning, Government preparations vary greatly and in most cases are a long way from being complete. In the international field they need a great deal more practical implementation.

It is clear that, until all risk of nuclear warfare has disappeared, preparations must be made to counter this major threat; at the same time, such preparations should be flexible, so that they can be adapted to meet lesser forms of attack or unforeseen combinations. It would seem to be essential to provide training and equipment for the civil defence services against chemical and biological warfare, since a surprise attack by these weapons against an unprepared service could have the most serious consequences. Ideally, these preparations should include the civil population, which would entail the provision of respirators, as was done in Britain before the last war.

While tactical surprises are probably inevitable in war, and need not be more than disconcerting, it is essential to guard against major political or strategic surprises which could be disastrous.

It is especially important to think, not in terms of long drawn out wars, but ones lasting for days or even only hours. The battle will be joined, at the outset, with maximum strength. There can be no question of fighting a holding operation while gathering strength, as has so often happened in the past. The first round must be won or the consequences will be grievous.

It will never be possible to achieve a proper state of readiness on the Home Front, until Governments are prepared to devote a reasonable percentage of their defence budgets to civil emergency planning, which includes civil defence. With few exceptions, the present figures are usually about 1% or even less. This is wholly inadequate, when it is considered that, if the Home Front collapses from lack of proper pre-war preparation, the whole defence system of a country and the NATO Alliance may be broken up. The civil population have got the last word; which must never be forgotten. If they should decide not to fight or that they have had enough after a short time, the war would be lost.

Chapter 2

The Time and Warning Factors

There are two aspects of the time and warning problem. How much warning will there be before the actual outbreak of war? And once started, how much warning is likely before any attack takes place? In other words, how much use is the siren going to be?

The second question is more easily answered than the first. Even with the latest early warning network now being completed the answer is a very few minutes as a maximum; and for some countries a few seconds. In the last war, both Britain and Germany had enough time to get people to shelter and Civil Defence workers to their posts, if they were not on duty already. The warning systems, in both countries, were highly developed and good, thanks to radar; the only excep-

tions being low level "tip and run" raids, which got under the radar screen and the rockets (V2s), though a technique for tracking missiles now exists.

The first question is much harder to answer with any confidence. There are a series of circumstances, or alert stages, which have been laid down and which it is hoped to follow before any actual outbreak of war. But there is no guarantee that if it came to the point these or any other sequences should be followed, either in whole or in part. It is always possible that there may be a state of political tension of uncertain duration before any actual hostilities. But even assuming this to be so, such a state might suddenly become one of war without any intermediate stages.

It seems unlikely that war would start literally as a bolt from the blue, without any indication beforehand. The difficulty may lie in reading the signs correctly, since their origin may be remote and obscure. It is of vital importance, however, to take the fullest advantage of any available warning period to reach as great a state of readiness as possible.

It is at this point that political considerations become a matter of overriding importance, and the well known and understandable reluctance of democratic governments to take any action which might seem to be provocative during a state of tension. A short diversion on this vitally important matter is necessary, at this stage, because there is need for some fresh and up-to-date political thinking. It can be assumed, as a *sine qua non,* that whatever happens or whatever we do, we shall be called provocative and aggressive; everything that happens will be distorted so that it will appear to be entirely our fault and responsibility. Such propaganda tactics are part of communist techniques—also Dictators—of which the world has had only too much experience. It is essential to recognize and accept this situation; if we do not, we may risk losing the battle before it is joined.

The democratic countries will have a clear conscience and will be much more likely to prevent war if they negotiate from strength, especially if this strength is fully mobilized. It is certain that our opponents will be arguing, or attempting to dictate, from strength, or will try and bluff us that this is so. We must guard against the risk of being humbugged and getting the worst of all worlds.

If a case is to be argued successfully before the United Nations and the world, it must be from confidence in our immediate ability, individually and collectively, to resist aggression, not from a sense of fear of attack because we know we are unready. It is certain that our weakness will be obvious and exploited to the full.

It is emphasized that risks will have to be taken because a future war will have to be fought with what we have got at the time, not on the basis of a build up afterwards. If we gamble on being able to negotiate a peaceful settlement and fail, we shall be lost. We cannot afford such gambles with the time factors as they are today and the immediate hitting power that exists.

If this assessment of the situation is reasonable and fair, and post-war diplomatic experience suggests that it is, then it is clear there are a number of important matters needing careful time and motion studies. Some of the most important may be illustrated by the following broad questions:

(*a*) How long will it take to mobilize the civil defence forces?

(*b*) How long will it take to complete their equipment, either by issue from depots, local purchase or whatever the arrangements may be?

(*c*) How long will it take to requisition transport and get it ready for action?

(*d*) If there should be a rush of volunteers or other sources of manpower are made available to civil defence, how long will it take to get them organized, equipped and given some essential training?

(*e*) How long will it take to get communications' networks operational: such as reservations of telephone lines and matters of this kind?

(*f*) What is the plan about personnel of the different services? Are they to try and work from their homes as many did in the last war, or from depots or where? And, if they are to work away from home, how long will it take them to get to their war stations?

(*g*) If evacuation is planned from large cities, how long will it take?

(*h*) If, as is highly probable, the public are told to stock up their emergency supplies, how long will this take and will there be enough supplies to go round? If not, how long will it take to make good deficiencies?

(Note: the assumption must be made that the majority of the public will not have made extra provision beforehand, and the normal supplies available in a household may vary widely, may be only partially suitable for storage and may not necessarily be what is required.)

The importance of knowing the answers to these questions and having the necessary plans worked out is obvious but there are two aspects of the situation that might arise which require special mention. Firstly, during a state of tension—or if such a state seems to be developing—the Government might need to know ur-

gently how long these preparations are likely to take, so that they can assess the risks if no action was authorized. Secondly, if the Government seems to be ignoring this vital aspect of defence, despite an obvious threat of war, the Minister of Defence can put the facts before the Cabinet.

The Minister of Defence has been suggested as the right person to take action, instigated by the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The alternative would be the Home Secretary, preferably supported by the other Ministers having responsibilities in this sphere, that is, Civil Emergency Planning. It is doubtful if this aspect of Defence gets as much attention from the Minister of Defence as its importance warrants but that is another question.

The procedure in Britain has been quoted, but the same ideas would apply in other countries, although with modifications to suit political and other differences.

As has been said, for political reasons, it is unlikely that any overt action will be authorized until the last moment, though certain covert action can probably be taken. The military authorities are, in many ways, better placed than the civil authorities, and can take various steps to bring certain of their forces to a state of immediate readiness quickly and without attracting much, if any attention.

On the civil side such action is more difficult, especially where the civil population are involved, when any precautions ordered must be public at once. The question immediately arises as to whether this distinction between overt and covert action can be safely maintained any longer. If it is a question of survival, then we cannot afford to take the many risks we have taken in the past and which such a policy inevitably entails. There will be no time to catch up.

It is suggested, therefore, that we should plan and work out in detail such of our preparatory action as must of necessity be left until war threatens and carry out regular exercises, not only to get the timing cut down to a minimum, but to ensure that the operation will work smoothly. These remarks apply to the whole Atlantic Alliance, as we shall sink or swim together

We must also know what can be done without attracting undue attention and how long it will take to do it.

These are formidable tasks, though they are familiar enough to the Fighting Services. There are so many uncertainties about the future, however, and experience has shown that, even with the most careful thought and planning, events have a habit of developing, not only in unexpected ways, but with disconcerting speed. That is a lesson which Dictators should have taught us.

The only safeguard is to be prepared for sudden and quick action. If more time is available than was expected, so much the better, but we must not expect time to be on our side. Any warning is likely to be short and a small hot war or a long drawn out cold war might quickly change and assume menacing proportions in no time at all. If we ignore these facts, we do so at our great peril.

Chapter 3

The Survival Problem

The question is frequently asked: "Can we survive a nuclear attack?" Ammunition has been given to the school of thought that considers we shall all be wiped out, by the late Nevil Shute's book *On the Beach* and the film verson which had a very wide circulation.

Both the book and the film were science fiction. I think General Huebner, who was head of the New York State Civil Defence Organization, has summed up very truly, both the book and the film. "*On the Beach*", he says, "overlooks the fact that defence against radioactive fallout is not only possible, but relatively simple, and that few people need die from this aspect of nuclear blast". He adds that "the movie . . . also lacks scientific basis for some of its notions of radioactive phenomena. The radioactive elements released by nuclear explosions are, for the most part, short lived and do not drift in deadly potency for months".

This is a statement of fact. There can be no doubt that if the proper precautions are taken, survival will be possible, but some difficult problems are posed which will be examined in this chapter.

An interesting book *Alas Babylon* by the late Pat Frank has been published in the United States and Great Britain. In it a smallish township is depicted, which finds itself isolated by fallout and describes how it managed to survive. It brings out strongly the lesson of preparation beforehand, studies the behaviour of people in a most interesting way and describes all the improvisations, pooling of resources and so on which enabled life to continue, although the community was completely isolated from the rest of the country. It shows how local leadership developed and highlights how previous preparations would have spared the community many of the inevitable privations they had to endure. It has some interesting hints on how to make use of existing natural resources.

This novel is constructive fiction and it would have been interesting if the author had developed his theme a

little and given his ideas as how the community, having survived, then fought back.

This diversion into the realms of fiction has been made because of the influence that such stories can exert, especially in a negative way. It is now time to look at the practical essentials for survival.

There must be, in the first place, adequate Central and Local Government plans and preparations covering the whole field of Civil Emergency Planning. Such national plans must be supported by international action by NATO to ensure that outside help can be made available, as far as it may be needed, and the resources of the Alliance are used for the benefit of all members and equitably distributed on a priority "need" basis. Such supplies must be of a strictly "survival" nature, the absolute necessities of life. But this chapter is concerned with the population and it will be assumed that these wider preparations have been made and are adequate for their purpose.

It must be accepted, unfortunately, that there will be heavy casualties. The big problem is how to reduce them as far as is humanly possible. The fact must also be accepted that, except where special natural facilities exist, protection in the area of complete destruction by a nuclear weapon is impracticable. On the other hand, in the outer areas, the problem resembles that of the last war, though on a vastly greater scale. The obvious answer, therefore, is to evacuate the population from those parts of the probable target areas where no protection can be provided and make shelter provision for the remainer up to last war standards: against blast, splinters and fallout. The population living away from target areas will need fallout protection for themselves and also for livestock.

The ideal policy is easier to prescribe than to apply in practice. Only a very few NATO countries and one or two outside the Alliance, have made any serious attempt to face up to the first stage of the survival problem—the prevention of casualties. Although the financial implications are formidable, there is a good deal that could and should be done to provide protection, if advantage is taken of the facilities offered by new construction, the use of underground garages and basements of houses. Such provisions are not necessarily uneconomic and can be put to useful service in peacetime.

The fact must be faced that the population, certainly of those countries which were bombed, know how much they owe to shelters. In the future, they might be faced with a risk infinitely greater in intensity and with far less, if indeed any protection against it. This may be asking too much. They must be satisfied that the best has been done in the circumstances. However much their own apathy may be to blame, they will inevitably turn on their Governments with results which could, in certain circumstances, be of the utmost gravity, not only for their own country, but for the whole Alliance.

If the maximum number of the population is to survive, provision should be made for fallout shelters outside the main target areas, last war standard shelters for those living outside the probable zones of complete destruction in target areas and evacuation of the inner zones, which to be effective, should be carried out before war actually starts. Afterwards it will be too late, except in those areas which have not suffered the initial attacks.

The complementary question is that of living in shelters for some days. This is a new problem from that of the last war. A number of tests have been carried out in the United States and elsewhere which prove that a family can live in a shelter for a fortnight, provided the operation has been carefully planned, and the necessary food, stores and domestic needs provided. But again everything must be ready for occupation at short notice.

So much for survival during what might be called the "attack phase", which will probably be short, but will cover the period during which people must remain in shelter because of the fallout risks.

The "post survival phase" will now begin, which will present problems of great difficulty and complexity. I believe that, in this phase, the wardens' posts will, at the outset, have a most important role. I visualize them as "rallying points". In the first place the public must look to the Wardens for leadership. It may well be that their numbers are insufficient, in which case they should be supplemented by street or block leaders, working under them, who should be selected and trained in peacetime.

I believe this arrangement to be necessary, because conditions may be chaotic. The first thing will be to rally the public and get them organized to help themselves. It will now be a question of fighting back, probably, at the start, on an area basis. Such areas may have to be small at the outset, their size being dictated by local conditions. As opportunity offers they can be expanded and should, as far as possible, be made to conform to existing local authority or other administrative boundaries.

At this stage, it will be essential for these "pockets of resistance" to pool their surviving resources, natural and artificial, until help can arrive from outside; their main task will be the rehabilitation of their areas, so far as local resources allow. They may have to live off the land to some extent and it is suggested that part of Civil Defence training, especially of wardens and leaders,

should be on the lines taught in the Services, on how to survive. Voluntary classes in the same subject for the civil population would be very valuable and could be made interesting. Such training might become, also, part of that of cadet forces, scouts and guides, so far as it is not already covered. We are so spoon-fed now-a-days, that we could not long survive under the sort of conditions that are likely to prevail, unless given some previous training.

This is really the second phase of survival. Once this phase has been consolidated it should be possible to start on the third phase, that of rehabilitating the country.

During the second phase, the Government and other authorities should be putting their emergency plans into operation, such as distribution of food, generally taking stock of the country's surviving resources and how they can best be used and distributed for the common good. Help will almost certainly be needed from outside but, until the internal position is known, it will be impossible to assess properly the nature of such help. Once these estimates have been prepared then, under the auspices of NATO, arrangements can be made to try and make good the urgent deficiencies which members of the Alliance have reported. This might be done partly by a redistribution of existing stocks within the Organization and partly from outside resources.

It is impossible to visualize what the situation will be with any accuracy, since there are so many unknown factors. But it might be possible to use such organizations as OECD, the International League of Red Cross Societies and other appropriate international bodies. The Common Market might also be capable of adaptation to this purpose.

It is obvious that, if existing organizations can be used, it will make the work easier and should enable it to be carried out more expeditiously.

This is the survival problem. To be successful, the measures suggested must be planned beforehand, be capable of being set up at short notice and be flexible to enable unforeseen situations to be met. They should be the subject of peacetime exercises.

Those things that cannot be done at short notice should be done now or there may be no time. And, as has been pointed out, it will be essential to use any period of pre-war tension to complete these preparations which must be left to the last minute. None of these precautions are aggressive in any way, they are humanitarian and Governments should not hesitate to see that all is as ready as it can be. There must be no gambling with the lives of the population. If war is averted nothing will have been lost. These preparations may have helped to prevent it. On the contrary if action is delayed until too late, the results might be disastrous.

One last reflection. It must be assumed that the active defences and the action of the retaliatory forces will keep the scale of attack within reasonable bounds —a somewhat comparative term in nuclear warfare—but extremely important, nevertheless, just as it is with conventional weapons. To allow a country to be exposed to unrestricted and unimpeded attack, of whatever kind, with all the weapons which modern armories can command, could clearly prove fatal.

Chapter 4

The psychological aspect of protecting the Civil Population

A good deal has been written and said about psychological warfare. In the main, such studies have tended to be more from the military than the civil aspect, as far as war and preparations for war are concerned, and the emphasis has been, also, on the use of this weapon offensively rather than defensively.

The civil aspect, and especially as it concerns Civil Defence and the civil population is of equal importance and presents its own special problems, which are of some complexity.

The tasks of Civil Defence is the physical protection of the civil population, which should be effected, as far as possible, by action to prevent or reduce the number of casualties by the provision of shelters, arrangements for evacuation and so on; and when casualties do occur as is inevitable, to provide the organization to rescue them, give first aid, provide hospitalization and generally look after their welfare. There are, in practice, two kinds of casualties—those who are physically injured and those who are rendered homeless and perhaps destitute.

All these precautions are essential; if adequate and efficient, they will greatly help in maintaining the morale of the civil population. By themselves, however, they are not enough because the minds of the civil population must be protected as well. Just whose responsibility this will be, is a matter for national decision; but is one of great importance. It will be no use, for example, to provide shelters for the public if, having gone into them, they either refuse to come out or do so before it is safe.

The mind can be frightened by propaganda in peacetime—by threats much as the Russians make from time to time. This might be termed a preparatory or loosening up stage, designed to soften the minds of

the population, making them fear conscious. In the extreme case, it might be hoped they would refuse to fight. If war does come, however, this preliminary mental attack could result in the population having no stomach for the fight and forcing the Government to sue for peace on any terms.

In war time, an enemy will intensify his threats, using every modern medium of propaganda, and will pretend, as has been done in the past, that he knows more than he really does and has been more successful than the official communiqués admit. This form of psychological attack can be dangerous, especially if it succeeds in engendering distrust of the Government. It is also a method of seeking information.

The protection of the mind, therefore, is important, both in peace and war, a fact which is not always appreciated. One of the difficulties, in any future nuclear attack, may well be the isolation of members of the community in fallout or other shelters for some days on end. People will be cut off from the outside world and all their normal daily social contacts. Since many of the population are gregarious by nature, this isolation will be a mental strain and could help in the attack on the mind. There is another point, which is the dependence of many of the population on public entertainment. Whatever the merits or demerits of this trend, it results in making adults and children less self reliant. This habit of mind could be receptive to skilful enemy propaganda especially during a period of tension or crisis.

Every effort should be made, therefore, to disseminate news by broadcasting or any other means that may be possible. It could be a critical job for Civil Defence. During this period of isolation, because of their knowledge and equipment, they may still be able to move about to a limited extent. The wardens, for example, should make every effort to keep in contact with the people in their area. Some kind of broadsheet could, perhaps, be dropped from the air by helicopter or light aeroplane—a job for light aeroplane clubs, which the wardens could collect and distribute. Such broadsheets would have to be wrapped in cellophane bags or some covering material which is impervious to fallout and would have to be handled and opened by people wearing gloves or using tongs so as to avoid contamination of themselves and the contents.

Personal leadership is of great importance for mind protection but it is not going to be easy to exert during the isolation of the fallout period, except where small communities are in a clear area, although cut off from the rest of the neighbourhood. Local leadership can be exerted in such cases, but the feeling of remoteness will be there and must be combatted. These problems should be given thought because their successful solution will be an important factor in sustaining the will of the people to fight on.

One of the difficulties of today is the tendency to feed the population on all the horrors of war with little or no mention as to how they can be combatted. It is a sad, but true fact that good news is no news and bad news in good news. There is the risk, therefore, of the mind —perhaps unconsciously—becoming receptive to hostile propaganda, a sort of slow erosion. This is why it is so important to counteract this tendency in every possible way and to keep up a steady propaganda of the right sort, to balance that which is harmful.

The Iron Curtain countries, especially Russia and China, are attacking the minds of the non-Communist world today and seizing every opportunity of making mischief. Their aim, certainly in the case of Russia, though possibly less so in the case of China, is to seek a peaceful solution: to win over the world to Communism without having to fight for it. But this propaganda can also be a useful preparation for war; this fact must be realized and means found to counteract it. We should be prepared to defend, not only the bodies, but the minds of the population. In the last resort, the will to win, the spirit that will not admit of defeat, will be the deciding factor. In fact, the spirit of Britain during the darkest days of the last war.

In the next chapter, I propose to consider how Civil Defence can help on what I like to call the positive or constructive side of building up mind resistance. But, in wartime, one of the most important things for families will be a battery wireless set, so that they can receive instructions, news and music even if the electricity supply is cut off, a most likely contingency.

On the Government side, emergency plans should envisage the use of mobile broadcasting stations or any other means of maintaining communication with the public, even though the main stations are put out of action. The regionalization of broadcasting, which exists today in many countries, can probably help in this matter. But broadcasting from the territory of another member of the Alliance might also be a solution—an example would be Radio Luxembourg—if the facilities remain intact. Have the "Hams" as the Americans call them, or amateur wireless enthusiasts got a part to play in all this? It is worth exploring. The usual British practice is to suppress them on the outbreak of war; is this necessarily the right policy in the future?

I have already stressed the importance of doing everything to counteract the feeling of isolation. The world today has very good communications, which continue to improve; I almost said too good communications! And the mental shock and drastic readjustment necessary to endure this complete reversal of modern

usage might produce a most dangerous vacuum. The enemy would know this and might try hard to fill it with his own propaganda. It is this situation that we have got to meet and defeat. I can well remember, in the last war, the temporary feeling of helplessness that hit the personnel in some Civil Defence control centres when their telephones went out of action. We are always in a hurry these days and we must learn that, if circumstances force us to "go slow", things can still get done—even better done perhaps.

Chapter 5

Civil Defence and the Public

An important question for Civil Defence in peacetime is that of public relations, of which there are two aspects. The first is to attract volunteers to the service and having persuaded them to join to hold on to them. The second is the training of the public in self-help an making every effort to counteract the idea that there is no defence against nuclear attack.

I say this is a job for Civil Defence, which is true; but it is a political question and cannot be done without the full backing of the Government. Civil Defence is, however, one of the best agents to use for this purpose.

Women's organizations can be especially helpful and the Women's Voluntary Services in Britain have their most admirable "One in Five" scheme, under which they aim to get one household in every five in the country with some elementary knowledge of self-help.

However, to return to the broader aspects of this question, success or failure will obviously depend on how the matter is presented to the public. There is the real difficulty that, politically, scare tactics are unacceptable for obvious and sound reasons, whereas ordinary propaganda, which has to compete with all the current topics and entertainments, is apt to fall flat. There is still a disposition on the part of the public to regard Civil Defence as something to be taken seriously only when a crisis threatens, and a failure to realize the amount of knowledge and training required to reach the high state of efficiency which Civil Defence operations demand. A section of the public take the view that there is nothing to be done and that Civil Defence is not only quite useless, but is deliberately deluding the public and trying to make them believe that war is inevitable. This sort of attitude is defeatist and the allegations are pure nonsense. It is, nevertheless, an attitude that cannot be ignored and it is not easy to combat.

The education of the public to the risks they might have to face, what they might be required to do and particularly, what they can do to help themselves is a matter of high importance, though its accomplishment will not be easy.

The United States and Britain have Civil Defence weeks, when a special drive is made to recruit volunteers and generally to alert the country to the importance of Home Defence. The United States, especially, make great use of broadcasting, getting all the networks to devote a period exclusively to Civil Defence. But, by and large, all types of media are used, such as posters, pamphlets, exhibitions, parades, special displays by Civil Defence personnel and so on. Canada also, has a special feature week with a nation-wide Civil Defence exercise.

The means employed must be suited to the community and what might be valuable in one country might have the reverse effect in another. Civil Defence weeks entail an immense amount of work and preparation. Whether the results justify the means is hard to judge although probably the short term effect is good.

As a means of helping maintain interest, the issue of national and local Civil Defence Journals and Bulletins is useful and widely practised amongst NATO and other countries. Such publications can also have a propaganda value, although in most cases that is not their primary object. In the Netherlands, the *Stichting Bevordering Bescharming Bevolking (B.B.B.)* have produced cigarette lighters, ash trays, small pennants and other souvenirs with the Netherlands Civil Defence crest on them. Such things are certainly a help.

Films are useful, provided cinemas can be persuaded to show them; not always an easy matter. If they are to have any success they should be short an have a strong appeal. I have on a few occasions been given five minutes to talk to a cinema audience between pictures but I am doubtful whether much, if any, result was achieved. People pay to go to the cinema to escape, temporarily into other worlds—however improbable they might be. They do not, therefore, expect to be subjected to Government propaganda, especially about war, even thought they are not averse to watching a battle, murder and sudden death being enacted for their amusement. All highly illogical, but that is human nature.

Television is another important medium for reaching the public and may be, in many ways, a more suitable one than the cinema. It offers more scope, in that the subject can be given a wider variety of treatment: discussions, short plays, short films and talks. But care is necessary as to what is put over and above all what result it is hoped to achieve, since this will govern the method of presentation.

It seems probable that the best answer to all these questions is to try and keep up a steady pressure of publicity by every possible medium. Local newspapers are valuable, as they are generally read more carefully than the big national press. They may be more easily persuaded to carry a regular Civil Defence feature.

(*Continued on page 17.*)

SASKATCHEWAN EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR REPORT TO PROVINCIAL-MUNICIPAL CONFERENCE

by

B. L. Korchinski, Director, Saskatchewan EMO

The Saskatchewan Emergency Measures Organization had its beginning after the sad experience of the Second World War, in which it was found that lives of civilians may be saved if emergency plans to meet the disaster caused by enemy attack were made in advance. This organization was then known as Civil Defence which in 1961 became known as the Emergency Measures Organization. At the present time the aims of this Organization are to serve a dual purpose:

a) to prepare emergency plans for civilian survival under atomic attack, and to ensure the continuity of government,

b) to prepare emergency plans for averting or minimizing disasters that may be caused by nature, such as floods, blizzards, air plane crashes, mine cave-ins, conflagrations, etc.

It is now recognized by all forward looking countries of the world that planning to meet an emergency and preparations to minimize disaster, whether the danger to human lives or property arises from natural causes or enemy action, these preparations are the responsibility of all levels of civil government. In Canada, the responsibility for planning for emergency is recognized to be an inherent function of every level of civil government: federal, provincial and municipal.

Since all Canadians live in municipalities, that is in cities, towns, villages and rural municipalities, the responsibility of the elected municipal officials for the security of these people is grave indeed. Planning and readiness for emergency to avert disaster within the municipality, large or small, is an intrinsic function of the municipal government, a function which in the past has not always been fully exercised.

I am not going to go into an exhaustive argument to prove the probability of disaster striking your community. If we observe carefully the unstable world scene with a constant threat of nuclear hostile exchange between the world powers; if we realize that because of industrial advance the probability of all kinds of accidents, crashes, explosions, cave-ins, collapse of buildings and structure; if we realize that floods and fires are always probable and that we are in the path of severe tornadoes which in the past 75 years struck Saskatchewan over 200 times claiming scores of lives and millions in property damage, we soon become quite concerned with emergency planning.

Although this organization had its beginning some 15 years ago, and whereas most of the Canadian provinces have made steady progress in preparing their people for emergency, our province is just beginning to evolve a comprehensive coverage. The costs of administration of this organization are borne by the Federal Government paying 75% and the province and municipalities the remaining 25%. Up to this year, Saskatchewan was the only province that was not contributing any funds to this 25%, the whole 25% was borne by the municipality which chose to set up an Emergency Measures Organization.

Therefore, provincially, our first pressing need was to have a better understanding by, and to obtain

Mr. B. L. Korchinski

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. B. L. Korchinski, recently appointed Director of the Saskatchewan Emergency Measures Organization, formerly represented the constituency of Redberry, Saskatchewan, in the provincial legislature.

approval and support of the Provincial Cabinet. I am happy to report that the present Cabinet has shown understanding of the aims and aspirations of EMO. The Premier and his Ministers are beginning to realize and understand that emergency planning is an intrinsic function of every level of government—federal, provincial and municipal. You have heard that the Premier of Saskatchewan, Hon. W. Ross Thatcher, has recently issued a policy letter urging his Ministers and their Deputies to get on with the preparation of emergency plans and of an over-all provincial survival plan. Subsequent to the Premier's letter, we had a meeting of the deputies and agency heads to take the first steps in preparing emergency survival plans. This meeting was addressed by the Premier, who again stated the policy of the government and urged all concerned to get on with the necessary work.

Financial Aid to Municipalities

At the meeting the Premier also announced that the Province is now prepared to pay half of the municipal share of EMO costs. He also stated that if certain organization standards are met the Province will help the municipalities to buy additional fire fighting equipment for training purposes, and also to serve as a supplement to existing municipal fire fighting services.

These two announcements, I am sure, are quite welcome, because at least some of the heavy municipal tax burden will be relieved. The municipal control committees may be able to expand their emergency planning work to make it more effective. These announcements created new province-wide interest in EMO. We are going to be able to do more effective work. Each provincial department has appointed a planning officer to devise and co-ordinate the departmental plans into an over-all Provincial Survival Plan. Our staff organized and prepared an Orientation Course for the departmental planners which was held at Valley Centre, Fort Qu'Appelle in the middle of November. At this course, the planning officers from the various departments considered what a provincial plan is, and how to prepare it.

I would also like to inform you of our hopes and plans for the municipalities of the whole province. As you know there are some 800 municipal governments in Saskatchewan. These include our cities, towns, villages and rural municipalities. According to law, each municipality is responsible for having its own emergency measures organization, but some of the municipalities, such as villages and hamlets have so few people that it would be impractical to set up an emergency measures organization similar to what we have in some cities, with all the various services, because there would not be enough people to man all the positions. Again, to use that worn-out saying—"We would have too many chiefs and no Indians". No one would be left to be protected.

To remedy this situation, we are now working on a mutual aid area basis. We hope, as the time passes, to be able to include in Saskatchewan EMO every municipality in our province. We hope the municipalities will see the wisdom of combining to help each other in time of disaster. The Mutual Aid Area will consist of a large urban centre with the surrounding area of 25 to 50 miles radius, including the villages, hamlets, and rural municipalities therein.

The Control Committee will consist of municipal councillors, at least one from each participating municipality. There will be an EMO Director, likely in the centre, in EMO headquarters. The participating municipalities will have deputy directors in their own communities. Of course it is expected that all municipalities will contribute funds on a per capita basis towards the operation of the areas. As the actual cost to the municipality will be only 12½ cents on the dollar, this will be the best value the municipality will receive for its expenditure.

The more you give this Area concept thought, the more you will see that the benefits to be derived from the arrangement far outweigh the objections. Such an Area will enable each municipality to benefit from additional fire protection, police protection, training in various services to prepare the citizens for emergency resulting from natural disaster or disaster caused by enemy action. Each municipality will then have a chance to contribute some manpower to man a service for which it may be best fitted, for example, some may specialize in rescue, or feeding, or clothing, or police work, or fire protection, etc., not excluding in these services any other municipality that may wish to contribute to a similar service. It is expected that everyone will work. There will be no "honorary positions" for persons who accept the appointment and then remain inactive. The matter is too serious to give it passing "lip service".

Priority by the provincial office will be given to the areas that show the most initiative and best organization.

In all this mutual aid campaign, information and know-how is essential. To this end, orientation courses in the areas and at Valley Centre will become a rule and not an exception. The know-how and enthusiasm of the Control Committee, the Director, the Service Heads and the personnel will be taken into consideration.

The Director is the "King Pin" in the whole set-up. He should possess all essential knowledge and unbounded enthusiasm if his area is to succeed and flourish.

We realize that we will have to be very patient and very persevering in our work. What we are trying to organize is not something that will be set up today and disintegrate in a year or two, but something that will be useful for the years to come.

You know it is impossible to predict where a disaster may strike, therefore we must be prepared.▲

FEDERAL MINISTER, DEPUTY MINISTERS AND DEPARTMENTAL PLANNERS VISIT CANADA EMO

The Canada Emergency Measures Organization moved into new offices on December 20, 1965. To mark the occasion an open house was held on January 6, 1966, to show current projects and new accommodation in the Centennial Tower, 400 Laurier Ave., W., Ottawa. About 60 senior officials, including deputy ministers, senior Army officers, emergency planners from federal departments and EMO officers were present when Hon. C. M. Drury, Minister of Industry, and Minister responsible for federal civil emergency planning, spoke informally on the importance of the organization's role in peacetime disaster situations and in the development of plans for Canada's survival in the event of nuclear war.

Hon. C. M. Drury, Minister of Industry, signing the guest book; Mr. C. R. Patterson, Director General, Canada EMO.



Mr. I. W. Robertson, Emergency Planning Officer, External Affairs, signing the guest book.

Mr. M. O. Woolford, Assistant, Technical Readiness Section, Canada EMO; Hon. C. M. Drury, checking dosimeters.



Mr. K. G. Farrell, Head, Fallout Protection Section, Canada EMO, describing portions of a model structure tested at certain blast overpressure levels; Dr. R. R. Logie, Assistant Deputy Minister (Operations), Department of Fisheries; Mr. A. P. Blackburn, Head, Exercises Development Section, Canada EMO; Mr. J. S. Beeman, Emergency Planning Officer, Department of Fisheries.

Hon. C. M. Drury speaking to visitors and staff of Canada EMO.



Mr. R. B. Bryce, Deputy Minister, Department of Finance, signing the guest book; Mr. C. R. Patterson, Director General, Canada EMO.

Mr. A. M. Pennie, Deputy Chairman, Defence Research Board, signing the guest book; Mr. A. F. B. Stannard, Scientific Adviser, Canada EMO.

Mr. A. H. Blake, Head, N.B.C. Defence Section, Canada EMO, explaining the use of urban characteristics analysis maps in vulnerability studies; Mr. R. F. Archambault, Emergency Planning Officer, Bank of Canada; Mr. A. E. Cooney, Chief, Operational Services Division, Canada EMO.

UNITED KINGDOM QUARTERLY FORUM

Reprinted from "The Association of Civil Defence Officers Journal", Vol. 12, No. 4, November 1965.

Six panel members were asked to comment on the question: "Generally speaking the Press has never been very generous in its support for Civil Defence, yet the success of our efforts must depend a great deal upon a sympathetic Press. What can or should be done at all levels to encourage a greater understanding of Civil Defence by both national and local newspapers?" The following four replies were extracted from the "Journal".

J. B. Adnams,
Civil Defence Officer, Brighton

"No one in any way connected with Civil Defence can disagree with the statement that generally speaking the Press have never been very generous in its support of Civil Defence. But before one can suggest how a greater understanding can be encouraged it is necessary to ascertain how the situation has arisen.

At any level, national or local, journalism is a business that must show a profit like any other commercial undertaking. To do this they must sell their product—customers will only buy if they like, and are satisfied with the product, which in this case is the newspaper, periodical, magazine, etc. Editors are usually all powerful and may refuse to publish anything they think may damage their paper's circulation.

There are some things that the public do not want to hear about and therefore they are of no value to the newspapers unless they can be presented in a controversial or sensational manner. Unfortunately Civil Defence is one of these subjects and this type of treatment usually results in a bad "image" being given.

Reporters, like any other class of people, vary in intelligence but even a highly intelligent reporter may not have much Civil Defence knowledge, and he could, therefore, ask what seems to a Civil Defender to be a stupid question. An answer given in a short or curt manner may well result in a story being presented from a hostile angle—reporters are only human.

Editors, in order to beat competitors, have to print stories quickly and inaccuracies can be included. This annoys those people who "know" but is generally not noticed by the majority of readers.

These are some of the reasons why Civil Defence can get a "bad" press—what can be done to improve the situation?

Ideally, at National Press level, all papers should be encouraged to appoint a Civil Defence correspondent. This would go a long way to ensure that any facts printed were correct and that reports would be written by someone with a sound knowledge of his subject. It would also mean that editors would have a qualified person to whom they could refer on Civil Defence matters at short notice.

Local press should be dealt with at Corps Authority level and this would ensure that statements are not obtained from Civil Defence Staff or Volunteers who, although they give the best of their knowledge or ability, can but be compared to a very junior officer or other rank of the Army being asked some highly technical or strategic questions on Defence, whereas such questions could only be answered accurately and without giving unintentional false conclusions by a senior officer holding some high command or staff appointment.

Each Corps Authority should designate one of its Senior Staff to be Press Officer. This Officer must be known by name to the Editors of all the papers which have a circulation in the administrative boundaries of the Authority. This Press Officer should handle ALL Press matters within the Division and be able to advise local Civil Defence Officers to ensure the best use is made of any item that has publicity value. This is of particular importance in a county where papers cover a large area, working in the main from a central town.

To do his job the Press Officer must establish friendly relations and gain the confidence of Editors and Reporters with whom he will deal and must learn to look at things from the "other fellow's point of view". At all times the Press must be kept fully informed within the limits of security. A correct understanding of the Press meaning of "Background", "On the Record" and "Off the Record", can do much to ensure satisfactory press conferences and interviews.

There are few enough occasions when Civil Defence activities warrant asking the Press to attend and therefore every suitable one must be exploited publicity wise. The Press must be fully informed in advance of Exercises, Parades, Field Days, etc., and should be automatically included in the distribution list of Exercises or other instructions.

The Press should also receive specific invitations to attend, be given the name of the officer detailed to meet and conduct them, the anticipated times of "high-spots" in any exercise to save waiting around when little of particular interest to them or their readers is going on. Some sort of refreshments should be offered; these need not be elaborate but the offer shows a good image of the organisation to the Press and make it more likely that they will come the next time you ask them.

Some papers like a regular flow of information and this requirement should be ascertained by the Press Officer. Papers will print about people rather than

things (it helps circulation) therefore the achievements of volunteers in the way of Standard and Advanced Tests, Promotions, Long Service Medals, should always be submitted.

If local Editors can be informed "off the record" when a local Division has problems (e. g. lack of clear policy directives, etc.) they normally appreciate the confidence and the Division will benefit from a sympathetic Press, at least in the area where their volunteers and recruits come from.

It must always be remembered that a good "Press" helps recruiting and therefore every effort must be made to retain the confidence of the Press and its representative."

W. S. Cosedge,
Civil Defence Officer, Woolwich

"It is said that there are always two sides to any question, and I believe we could, with advantage, apply this to the question posed.

For example, might it not equally be said that Civil Defence has never been very generous in its support for the Press? How often is the Press taken into confidence (at any level), and given up-to-date NEWS. How often are they invited to an exercise or a study, given a thorough "write-up" on the exercise both before *AND* after, and made to feel they are really welcome—really SOMEBODY?

And, unfortunately, not all exercises are good publicity. Some are poorly staged, lack realism, and take place in comparative secrecy in some carefully hidden training ground. These attract either adverse comment, or worse, no comment at all. Once, and only once, I was able to persuade the local Police Chief Superintendent to allow me to put on an exercise in the High Street, where we effected a number of rescues from the top floor of Littlewood's Store, and stopped the traffic too. Believe me, the local Press needed no encouragement to report this, with photographs. But it was not in London. I can just imagine the response from the Met. Police!!!

Let us remember that the Press owes us nothing. They are interested in news—TO-DAYS news—in the names of people—in the unusual—in local success and local tragedy. They are in business to sell newspapers, and if we have anything useful to offer them, they will be pushing their noses in, seeking NEWS, without any encouragement.

So what can be done to encourage them ————————? Well, whatever we do in this direction, we can expect only the publicity our activities warrant. If the publicity we get is biased against us, or is critical or derogatory, there may be something we can do. We could pay a visit to the editor and try to correct any misunderstandings he may have. We could offer to write an article (or even a short series of articles) covering a controversial aspect of our business.

What about courses for the Press? As I have said, they are always ready for a story, and *if* the invitation to them included a copy of the programme, and *if* the programme had been very carefully compiled, and *if* the invitation were delivered personally—to the editor, I believe they would, at least, send a representative. It might be necessary for two or more neighbouring areas to combine, to gather together a worthwhile class. It might pay big dividends if Regional Headquarters put on an occasional course—perhaps at the Staff College —for editors.

The Press are not unhelpful, as a rule; but they have no time for dull, uninteresting chit chat. All that is necessary is an occasional visit to them, to find out the kind of thing they want, and then keep them supplied with as much information as you can. And do not be disappointed if they use only 10% of all you send them.

And so I find myself questioning even the accuracy of the question put up to the Panel. I feel that, if the Press appears to be ungenerous or unhelpful, we should take a long hard look at ourselves."

P.S. I've just taken a long hard look at myself—and I find I'm as guilty as anybody!!!

P.P.S. Some of the views expressed in earlier "Forums" have been excellent. How many of these have you sent to the Press, Mr. Editor??

Maj. I. C. Scott,
Civil Defence Officer, Liskheard

"On seeing the question posed for the Quarterly Forum, I had the immediate reaction that this could not have been raised at a more appropriate time.

At the time of writing, a veil of mystery and uncertainty appears to be hanging over our heads, mainly contributed by a series of articles, (not as yet substantiated) in the National Press, some weeks ago.

Civil Defence is a subject which the average man in the street knows little or nothing about, also in many cases, as a Rate Payer he objects to having to pay for it. Therefore to bring Civil Defence before him it is vital that good publicity via the Press mediums be encouraged.

There may be many reasons for the average man's apathy towards Civil Defence, such as the sensational press "having a go", and knowing that the majority of its readers will "lap it up", or what in my opinion, is more likely, that we ourselves are guilty of not keeping the public adequately informed of all Civil Defence activities.

The Press is a vital medium for distributing publicity to a vast public, thus making our task of passing on the details of Civil Defence to the man in the street much easier.

The question now arises as to what can be done to encourage the Press, both National and Local, to take a greater interest in the work of the Civil Defence Corps.

I feel that the main lead must come from the Home Office, who like any one of the Services, should appoint a Press Liaison Officer, responsible for ensuring that Civil Defence is kept constantly in the public eye.

The same responsibility should apply at Regional level. At the lower levels, i.e. County or County Boroughs, one officer at County or County Borough Headquarters, should be appointed to co-ordinate all publicity within the County. I have found that information issued to the local Press from County Headquarters carries far more weight. At County Sub-Controls/ District Controls levels, a very close liaison is required between Civil Defence Officers and the Local Press. It is mainly at this level that one's Volunteers, reading local newspapers, are affected or potential recruits are influenced. The handling of the local Press can be very tricky, as I myself have found. Local reporters are very much like mathematicians, in that a report taken out of context can be made to represent something entirely different from what was originally intended.

I feel that the Press should be invited to all major exercises and functions, at all levels of control, and that special effort be made to ensure that they clearly understand what is happening. One can only blame oneself if after the event the reporter goes back and writes a garbled version of what he has seen and what he thought was happening (after all he is not a trained Civil Defence Volunteer), instead of the glowing report you expected. Any Press representative should have someone, who is fully in the picture as to all the functions of Civil Defence, appointed to look after them and to brief and explain what is happening. If possible, this should be the Civil Defence Officers responsibility, but this may not always be convenient and a reliable stand-in should be provided.

Finally, to sum up the position:—

(a) Civil Defence requires good publicity to survive, and this can only be achieved if the Press are one-hundred per cent with us.

(*b*) To gain the publicity required an all-out effort must be made to co-ordinate, at all levels, the required material and personnel to do this. The lead must come from the top branches, i.e. Home Office and Regions. This will result in better efforts and more understanding by the Press, and the work being done by the lower branches of Civil Defence will be brought to the public's attention.

(*c*) A closer liaison at all levels of Civil Defence with the Press, whether National or Local, and a greater effort to ensure that when reporters are present at Civil Defence exercises or functions they are looked after, kept informed of what is going on, and subtly initiated into Civil Defence.

(*d*) An ignorant man is a dangerous man."

J. W. Stoddart,

Deputy Group Civil Defence Officer, Renfrewshire

"Let us break the question down into its component parts and deal with each separately.

1. Generally speaking the press has never been very generous in its support for Civil Defence.
2. The success of our efforts must depend a great deal on a sympathetic Press.
3. What can be done at all levels to encourage a greater understanding of Civil Defence by National newspapers.
4. By local newspapers

Being a Scot with more than a trace of Highland blood perhaps you will forgive me if I start with No. 4, and with the national leaning towards argument let me say at once that I have yet to hear any of my colleagues complain about lack of support or sympathy on the part of the local Press. Local editors have been most helpful at all times, have given a great deal of space to Civil Defence news and activities, and have in fact reinforced our efforts with vigorous leading editorials from time to time.

Local newspaper advertising has brought me hundreds of recruits and if any Civil Defence Officer would like an analysis of results with a copy of the actual advertisement which has been so successful I shall arrange to send a copy on receipt of a stamped addressed envelope. (The Scot coming out again!)

Now for Part 3, and the quick answer is—"Not very much". At Divisional level the Civil Defence Officer may, by some chance, be able to influence the occasional individual reporter, a proverbial "Drop in the bucket", otherwise liaison must take place at high level. Our link with the National Press is ineffective below Regional level, and only stands a chance at Central Government level through the National Information Offices.

In the world of big business, and the National Press *is* big business, I am afraid the only voice which carries much weight registers on the cash register, and this means that the only real influence which could be brought to bear would be the effective threat to withdraw substantial advertising accounts. The National newspapers were not awarded advertising contracts this year and as a result may feel that they are not fouling any doorstep by having a lusty crack at Civil Defence.

We must face facts. Do not let us look towards the National Press with much dewy-eyed optimism; do not forget however that most of those who buy the National newspapers also take the local broadsheet. It pays dividends to cultivate the local newspapers, and it is just possible that a continuing favourable local climate may yet percolate down into the National Press gold mines and Civil Defence may take its humble place beside the edifying accounts of Child Murders, Earthquakes, Disasters, Rumours of War and all the rest that goes to make the National News.

Part 2 of the question is, of course, just plain soppy!

Any effort depending greatly on sympathy is doomed to failure since sympathy is an abstract quality which by its nature is largely passive. They who are not actively "for" us can take their sympathy to bed with them where its warmth will at least do some good. A little opposition is paradoxically more helpful than an ocean of passive sympathy which is sometimes difficult to distinguish from apathy, and may God preserve us from that! Opposition such as the "Daily Mail" recently supplied has given us more publicity than the National Recruiting Campaign has done for years. The article has produced a talking point and a topical opening for any amount of Civil Defence propaganda. Part of the reaction has been a wonderful article in the "Highland Herald" which I hope our editor will include in this issue of the Journal. The Civil Defence Officer who is not making the best of the "Daily Mail" article and Cliff Mitchelmore's subsequent boob should hide his head in shame. He is unable to use publicity when it is presented to him on a platter. Now is your chance to barge into print and to exercise your powers of persuasion because John Citizen is avid to hear what you have to say. Do not miss this chance of telling the world what Civil Defence is about. The current "All our Yesterdays" programme on I.T.V. is helping by giving more air space to Civil Defence than we could ever hope to buy. Let us not be myopic!

Part 1 of the question is not strictly true. If you think it is, you have a very short memory. The Press were very generous when we merited support. Unfortunately we do not make news until we go into action and if this is a necessary prerequisite to Press support we are infinitely better off without it at that cost.

If I may be permitted the space to summarise, my answer to the question posed is:—

(*a*) We have had support from the Press when it has been earned.

(*b*) Positive action, whether for or against, is much more valuable than mere sympathy.

(*c*) Little can be done with the National Press at any level which does not involve the expenditure of large sums of money, and that is unlikely.

(*d*) Moderate amounts of money spent on local press advertising creates valuable support which could grow to significance.

The question appears to be prompted by negative thinking. We should be more positive in our treatment of the opportunities which do arise gratuitously."▲

(*Continued from page 9.*)

It is important that this steady pressure is increased periodically during a national Civil Defence week, the occasion of a big exercise, the hotting up of the cold war or a national disaster in which Civil Defence has helped.

A number of countries have prepared a handbook or handbooks for the public. The United States has issued millions of pamphlets. When the East German wall was built in Berlin, the international reactions were used by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany as having created a favourable atmosphere in which to issue such handbooks to the public. The moment was obviously propitious and is a good example of what has just been said.

It is realized that what amounts to an opportunist policy is being advocated. But the difficulties facing Civil Defence in peacetime, and especially in trying to educate the public, are so great that any opportunity which is likely to influence the situation favourably must be exploited to the full, with special emphasis on the fact that Civil Defence, like the Fighting Services, is a vital part of the national and NATO shields.

This means that an extremely efficient public relations organization is required by Civil Defence, one that is staffed by people who have not only experience in this art, but also a sound working knowledge of the Service and its problems, the thoughts and feelings of volunteers, the general attitude of the public and how best they can be handled.

The staff of this office must have the confidence of those who are responsible for Civil Defence and should be closely in their councils. This point is especially important if the public relations staff are to pick up points which will lend thmselves to propaganda or public presentation. They must not be regarded as just "handers out" and interpreters of official communiqués to the Press, which must have an interesting background if they are to have any effect. News stories of good work done by Civil Defence personnel in peacetime have a particular value, especially if it can be shown that, thanks to their training, they were able to render skilled assistance and save life and suffering as a result.

International propaganda from NATO would be useful, as giving emphasis to national efforts and serving also to stress the importance of Civil Defence to the Atlantic Alliance. So far, there has been very little; even the fact that there exists a NATO mutual aid scheme in case of national disasters is hardly known outside official circles.

Publicity and propaganda for Civil Defence must be a continuous process. It should be alive, human and topical. It should be international, national and local. Public relations are a highly specialized art, without which any organization, especially a voluntary one, will be hard put to survive. An when it comes to the question of interesting the public in the right way, it is only by the most thoughtful and carefully prepared public relations that success can be achieved.

(*To be continued.*)

BRITISH HOME DEFENCE REVIEW

Statement by the British Civil Defence Department, Home Office.

As announced in paragraph 200 of the White Paper "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965", Cmnd. 2592, the Government have carried out a searching review of the form of our defence preparations in the years ahead, in the light of their general reconsideration of defence.

In that White Paper it was explained that the risk of a major nuclear war arising from a direct conflict between East and West could be almost entirely excluded as a result of the present state of mutual deterrence; that nevertheless we must maintain our guard because of the possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation; and that the Chinese nuclear explosion must remind us that the present stability might rapidly be jeopardised by the spread of nuclear weapons.

Against this background the Government have decided to maintain an effective civil defence policy as a measure of insurance against an unlikely event, so that if the worst were to happen the nation might yet survive as an organised entity. With proper preparation, much could be done to save lives, relieve suffering and help the millions of survivors. Studies have confirmed this.

But the country's economic circumstances are also very relevant—there is a limit to the resources that it would be right to devote to these preparations. Every measure that is adopted must be worth what it costs. And if an attack, against all probability, were to come there might be no more than a very short period during which overt precautions could be authorised: this limits the value of measures that cannot be maintained in a high state of readiness.

The Government have reviewed all home defence plans in the light of these factors, and have in general decided to restrict future preparations to measures which would be likely to make a really significant contribution to national survival. All the details have not yet been worked out, and in many instances there is need for consultation with the local authorities and other organisations and bodies before plans can be settled; but the main points are as follows.

The Warning and Monitoring Organisation, on which the country is dependent for warning of attack and the monitoring of radioactivity, and in which the Royal Observer Corps plays so valuable a part, will be maintained at a high level of efficiency. Further improvements in the system are planned.

The Government will continue to develop the emergency system of control, the purpose of which is, initially, to direct lifesaving operations and, subsequently, to provide a framework of civil administration to marshal and co-ordinate the use of available resources to the best advantage for the continued survival of the community.

The system includes the local authority controls, which would be manned primarily from local resources, together with a small number of representatives of government departments and public utilities. At this level the Government propose no change in the plans for the control system.

The Government will continue to plan for regional government in an emergency, but are introducing some changes in the interests of greater flexibility, and reliability of communications. The revised plans provide for the regional seats of government to be established as soon as possible after attack, under pre-arranged plans, at locations that would be selected in the light of the prevailing circumstances. There is to be improvement in the capabilities of the sub-regional controls, of which there are two or three in each region, for the co-ordination of life-saving operations and initial survival measures. In this way a greater measure of decentralised regional control will be provided during and just after an attack, which is desirable in view of the span and area of control that would have to be covered in very difficult conditions, particularly as regards communications.

The Government is consulting the local authority associations on the functions, shape and numbers of the Civil Defence Corps. They consider that it would be sensible to concentrate the available resources on a nucleus of highly trained volunteers, and the consultations will be for the purpose of seeing how the Corps might, with substantially reduced numbers, be best organised to carry out essential tasks. At a later stage discussions will be held with representatives of industry and commerce on the implications for the Industrial Civil Defence Service.

The Government will also continue to support the police and fire services in their emergency preparations, including the maintenance of the Auxiliary Fire Service. The police, in their task of public control, would receive help from the regular and reserve armed services, subject to military commitments.

Planning for emergency medical services will continue; the National Hospital Service Reserve will be retained.

The Government has reviewed shelter policy. To provide shelter against blast is impracticable, and for most people the best protection against radioactive fallout would be achieved in their home and acting on the advice that would be given to them. But for those in lightly constructed dwellings with a low protective factor, and perhaps for others in special need, some form of communal shelter is desirable if it can be found in suitable existing accommodation that is reasonably near at hand. The Government is accordingly following up the pilot survey arranged by the previous

(*Continued on page 19.*)

IN PEACE TIME AS IN WAR

by

LT. COL. J. V. ABELA, O.B.E., *Civil Defence Commissioner, Malta.*

Extracted from "Argus", Organ of the Malta Civil Defence, Vol. IV, No. 11, October-December 1965.

Peace time disasters range from a serious accident in a factory to severe floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. In countries subject to floods, hurricanes or earthquakes, their Government have set up a Disaster Organisation. This is either the Civil Defence Organisation they already have in being, or an emergency one that is preplanned but comes to life only on the onset of a disaster.

In Malta we have a Civil Defence Corps but no *ad hoc* Emergency Organisation; it is therefore the Civil Defence Corps that is most likely to be mobilised to deal with a major disaster in peace time, and this the Corps can do without any last-minute change in its control and life-saving set-up. As in war, however, the co-operation of certain Government Departments is vital, but plans for such co-operation already exist and it takes little time to put them into operation.

A peace time disaster would be more manageable than the aftermath of a nuclear explosion since, with no nuclear reactors in Malta, the hazards of radio activity would be totally absent.

The major problems confronting Civil Defence in a peace time disaster is, of course, the saving of lives, and this, as in war, has to be done in a selective and systematic manner, taking into consideration priorities in rescue, in the treatment of casualties and in casualty evacuation. Except in the case of a severe earthquake, which might cause widespread damage to buildings, the problems of housing and rehabilitation should present comparatively few problems and could well be left to the Government Departments principally concerned, that is: the Department of Housing and the Department of Social Welfare. The Civil Defence Corps working hand-in-hand with the Medical and Health Department would then direct its entire resources to life-saving.

All the four sections of the Corps would be mustered for the task as in war, but only on a scale depending on the severity of the disaster. The Headquarters Section, with its Operations, Signals and Reconnaissance elements would plan and direct the life-saving tasks while the Wardens would also be there as the indispensable link between Civil Defence and the general public, to help, to advise and to keep up the morale of the affected population. The Rescue section would have the most exacting task to perform, rescuing the trapped people and leaving the untrapped casualties to be dealt with by the Ambulance section, a task for which the women forming part of the Ambulance Companies of Civil Defence are well trained.

Having a Civil Defence Organisation as we do, peace time disaster control and all life-saving tasks would be channelled through the existing set-up, ensuring co-ordination of effort, smooth and speedy work while all along avoiding overlapping. Life-saving for Civil Defence in peace time, as in war, remains its *raison d'être* and all the instruction we give and the exercise we hold from time to time, are directed towards this one object, and because of the nucleus of well-trained whole-time staff, the Civil Defence Corps in Malta can intervene speedily in the event of a disaster which could strike unexpectedly.

* * *

It is almost unbelievable but as I finished writing this article for "Argus" a message came through from the Police to say that two men had fallen in a deep shaft at Dingli and only we in Civil Defence had the necessary rescue equipment. Would we get on with the work? We did, at once. A peace time disaster, albeit a minor one, and Civil Defence was on the job immediately and without any fuss. ▲

(*Continued from page 18.*)

Government by opening discussions with the local authority associations on the form of the guidance that might be made available to local authorities if they were asked to draw up shelter plans.

The current dispersal plan provides for the movement of the priority classes—mainly mothers and children—from cities to reception areas if the Government of the day were to decide that dispersal was the proper course. It would take at least a week to complete. The Government consider that there should be a scheme in readiness which could be carried out in a shorter period, and will accordingly invite the local authorities and the transport authorities to join in working out a plan under which the priority classes would make shorter journeys from the dispersal areas.

Plans for stockpiles and the due functioning of essential utilities and services, including broadcasting, have been reviewed and some adjustments have been made.

This is a general outline of the Government's plans. They will continue to be kept under review and adjusted as necessary in the light of any changes in strategic assessment.

As a result of this re-appraisal of the home defence programme expenditure is estimated at £19.7 million in 1966/67, as compared with the estimate of £24.1 million in 1964/65 and of £22.7 million in 1965/66.▲

SAUDI ARABIA CIVIL DEFENCE

A report on a programme for the organization of a civil defence administration in Saudi Arabia prepared by the International Civil Defence Organization, Geneva.

Summary of the Present Situation

The Royal Government of Saudi Arabia, anxious to ensure to an ever greater extent that the population is afforded protection in case of a disaster of any kind, invited Dr. Milan Bodi, A.F.I.C.D., Secretary General of the International Civil Defence Organization, to go to Saudi Arabia and verify the necessity and possibility of converting the present Fire Protection Administration into a Civil Defence Administration. According to this plan the measures which already exist providing for preventive action and intervention operations in case of fire would be supplemented by measures providing for rescue and relief, and for assistance for the homeless as well as other fields of activity making provision in peacetime for the civilian protection to be afforded in case of disaster.

During his travels in Saudi Arabia Dr. Bodi saw that it was essential for a Civil Defence network to be set up over the whole country in order to cope with the natural disasters which could threaten the population, as a result of accidents brought about by scientific progress or by some future war.

A facilitating factor for the creation in Saudi Arabia of a Civil Defence Administration in the above sense is the fact that this country already has (as Dr. Bodi was able to see for himself) a well-developed and extensive fire-fighting system with material and equipment for intervening in any case of fire and with personnel who are trained according to the same principles as those applying to the professional services.

Outline of the Civil Defence Project

Following the talks and study meetings which Dr. Bodi conducted with General Faiz Al Auffi, Director General of the Fire Protection Administration of Saudi Arabia, a basic plan was drawn up for providing the country with a Civil Defence organization. This scheme includes the setting up of a number of separate Divisions which together will go to make up the new Civil Defence Agency which itself will be subordinate to the Directorate General.

Directorate General

At present the General Headquarters of the Fire Protection Administration are made up of the following sections: Secretariat, Administration, Intervention, Training, Technical, Equipment, Finance, Budget, Legal and Statistics.

Using these Sections as a starting point, since their organization and working satisfy the present limited requirements, it has been found necessary to create a new Directorate General of the Civil Defence Administration and new Divisions which will correspond to the specialized activities entrusted to the Directorate General. The new Directorate will thus be in a better position to direct and co-ordinate the organization, training and equipping of the City Civil Defence Agencies into which the present Fire Protection Headquarters and municipal Fire Brigades will be integrated.

Divisions

The various tasks of the Civil Defence Administration will be assumed by the following divisions, whether they are attached to the Directorate General or to the City Civil Defence Agencies:

(a) Information
(b) Warning and Communication
(c) Fire-fighting
(d) Rescue
(e) First aid
(f) A.B.C. Protection
(g) Homeless care
(h) Sanitation
(i) Transportation
(j) Supplies
(k) Rehabilitation

(a) "Information" Division

At present the public are informed only about fire-fighting questions through the medium of the radio and the press.

It will therefore be essential that the population be informed on all problems pertaining to the new Civil Defence organization and that the personnel concerned should be constantly briefed on training, equipment and material. For this purpose there are various means, apart from the radio and newspapers, which are at present being used in other countries, such as television, pamphlets, circulars, posters etc. An official bulletin will also have to be published in order to provide information for the different Civil Defence Divisions, City agencies, Civil Defence officers and personnel.

(b) "Warning and Communication" Division

Saudi Arabia has at the present time no warning system. As far as alarm transmission goes it is fortunate that the various Fire Protection services are joined up by the G.P.O.'s telephone network (which is automatic or connected up by urban telephone exchanges). This is a great advantage in comparison with the old-type installations (field telephones) with which the Civil Defence services in certain countries are equipped at present. Wireless transmission is at present carried out

solely in the city of Mecca where the Fire Protection Headquarters is connected up with its various Fire stations by radiotelephone.

As the efficiency of Civil Defence is based namely on the alarm system, it is necessary to set up an alarm system which will be operated by a central alarm station and the required network. The choice of the alarm system will be made according to the potential hazards and geographic conditions of the country.

With respect to the organization of the wireless alarm transmissions within the Civil Defence Agency a central radiotelephone station will have to be set up at the Directorate General in Riyadh; wireless rooms will have to be installed in all the City Civil Defence agencies (at present Fire Protection Headquarters and Municipal Fire Brigades), and all the fire-engines and ultimately all the Civil Defence vehicles (fire-fighting, rescue and relief work, radiological protection etc.) will have to be equipped with radiotelephones so that they can be in permanent contact with their control stations.

(c) "Fire-fighting" Division

As mentioned in the introduction the Fire-fighting services with their development programme which is in the process of being put into effect are organized in such a way as not to require any further plans. It will therefore be sufficient to merge them into the general Civil Defence system of which they will become a division.

(d) "Rescue" Division

At the present moment the fire-engines are fitted out with some operational equipment for the debris clearing and the rescue of trapped persons. Moreover, the firemen have had some basic training in this field.

It is essential that the "Rescue" Division of the Civil Defence Administration organizes the City Civil Defence Agencies so that they can successfully intervene to carry out their rescue work such as tracking, searching, freeing of trapped persons and the debris clearing. This rescue work will not demand the complete retraining of the Civil Defence officers and personnel but will at the same time require up-to-date equipment which will on the one hand make for swifter rescue and on the other hand ensure the safety of the rescue workers and of those trapped under the debris. There exist at present in certain countries prescribed standards for rescue equipment including the vehicles which are specially fitted out with heavy and light rescue material.

(e) "First aid" Division

The transportation of the sick and injured in Saudi Arabia is carried out by municipal or Red Crescent ambulances. The Red Crescent has set up a number of first aid stations. The Fire Brigade personnel have a wire-netting stretcher on each of their fire-engines and have a grounding in how to transport casualties.

It is thus a question of re-organizing entirely the "First aid" Division and City first aid sections so as to create special teams trained in handling of casualties, resuscitation, dressing of wounds, fractured limbs, burns, etc. and fitted out with the essential equipment including first aid kits. The City Civil Defence agencies must have their own First aid stations and each intervention team must be equipped with an ambulance in order to ensure that the wounded can be transported independently of the present-day Services which could be overburdened in the event of a large-scale disaster.

(f) "A.B.C. Protection" Division

The protection to be afforded against atomic, biological and chemical weapons constitutes an entirely new field of activity. But apart from the danger from nuclear weapons there is the direct hazard which can result from the use of radioactive materials in medicine, industry and mining research.

Thus, the Civil Defence services will have to be able to intervene, in case of contamination through radiation, in the following two fields: (*a*) detecting the extent of the radioactive contamination and marking off the danger zone; (*b*) undertaking the decontamination of human beings, equipment, water and foodstuffs. The first task of this new A.B.C. Division will be to work out a plan for its organization and activity; Secondly, it will have to train its detection and decontamination teams; finally, fit them out with modern equipment which is constantly being improved owing to technical progress and increasing knowledge of the hazards brought about by radioactive materials.

Moreover, it will be necessary to work out some system whereby biologically and chemically contaminated areas can be located so as to allow measures to be taken to protect the population (water filtration, food monitoring, etc.).

(g) "Homeless care" Division

There exists at the present time within the Ministry of Labour the Department of Social Affairs (headed by the Deputy-Minister of Labour) which is entrusted, among other things, with the problem of housing and feeding the destitute.

The problem of evacuation, accommodation, feeding and care to the population according to the Civil Defence programme will be able to be solved with the collaboration of this Department and a joint intervention plan drawn up. This plan for intervening in case of disaster will include the collaboration, on a local footing, of these two governmental bodies: Department of Social Affairs and Civil Defence.

(h) "Sanitation" Division

The duties of the various Fire Protection services did not include up to now any such activity in the field

of sanitation, i.e. steps to forestall the hazard of epidemics, and the handling and transportation of the victims.

The large-scale natural disasters of Skoplje (Yugoslavia) and Longarone (Italy) showed up the necessity for the organization, training and equipping of City intervention teams. Thus, the new Sanitation Division and the local services will be entrusted with carrying out disinfecting work on the one hand and with handling human and animal remains on the other.

(i) "Transportation" Division

The Fire Protection Administration has at the present moment a large range of transport vehicles at its disposal including half-tracks, pick-ups, and jeeps accordingly as needed by the Fire Protection Headquarters and Municipal Fire Brigades.

However, the fact that each of the large centres of population sprawls over a wide area with great distances between them emphasizes the necessity for all types of road transport. The range of vehicles (which must be powerful and strongly built considering the climate) will therefore have to include, apart from the fire-engines, rescue and clearing vehicles, ambulances, and vehicles for transporting the supplies, personnel and diverse equipment. On account of the large number of vehicles assigned to the various Divisions and local agencies it is essential that a plan be worked out for putting them to use as well as for their technical supervision.

Apart from the vehicles quoted here and in the preceding sections it must be stressed that certain City Civil Defence agencies will need helicopters which are not only of great value in rescue work for penetrating into areas which are inaccessible by road or which cannot be reached quickly enough, but are also the best means of co-ordinating and directing intervention operations.

(j) "Supplies" Division

The General Headquarters of the Fire Protection Administration includes at present some Services which have the task of purchasing and maintaining the fire-extinguishing equipment, the personnel's clothing etc. The personnel must rely on their own resources for board.

The Civil Defence Administration will need a special Division which will be entrusted with stocking food and drinking water for the intervention teams as well as for the population. As for the equipment a useful provision is the possibility on the one hand of being able to set up field kitchens off-hand, and on the other hand mobile water-straining installations. The stocking of medicines and first aid equipment for use by the Civil Defence services will likewise be a function of this Division.

(k) "Rehabilitation" Division

This field of activity is particularly necessary for the Industrial Civil Defence, for here it is not only a question of protecting and rescuing people and goods but also of enabling the establishment to get back onto its feet. The Fire Protection Administration is at present collaborating with certain industrial enterprises with an eye to training their personnel for the event of their being called to intervene in case of fire. However, this activity does not make any provision for rehabilitation measures. It is therefore a matter of creating an entirely new Division whose task will be to act in concert with the responsible bodies in making provision and prior preparations for the rehabilitation of the public services, hospitals, administrative buildings, industrial and commercial enterprises etc. The rehabilitation work will of course, be incumbent upon the personnel of these various bodies and concerns; it will, however, be the task of the new "Rehabilitation" Division to take the initiative and see to the organization of this activity upon which the population will be depending for its existence. ▲

PRESS RELEASE

OTTAWA, MARCH 4—The Federal Government has agreed that the co-ordination of the initial federal response to peacetime emergencies and disasters in Canada shall be the responsibility of the Minister of Industry, Honourable C. M. Drury, it was announced in Ottawa today.

The decision was made following studies of the massive power failure which hit Northeastern United States and parts of Ontario November 9th, 1965. An Interdepartmental Committee on the Effects of the Power Failure presented its findings to the Government on February 1st, 1966.

Arising out of these findings it has been decided: "that a Minister be delegated responsibility for providing and co-ordinating the initial federal response to any peacetime disaster situation whether the federal government was either directly involved or called upon for assistance by provinces or municipalities; for the purpose the Minister of Industry, who was already authorized through the Canada Emergency Measures Organization to make co-ordinated plans for a war emergency, should have his authority extended to include peacetime emergencies or disaster".

With specific regard to the major power failure the Canada Emergency Measures Organization under the direction of the Minister and in consultation with the Department of Public Works of Canada, will co-ordinate a departmental and agency study of federal facilities providing essential public services to determine the need for emergency lighting and power. This study will also consider the need for providing reserves of mobile power units.

The study would pay particular attention to federal institutions such as hospitals and penitentiaries.

In consultation with the National Energy Board the Canada E.M.O. study will explore risks in supply and distribution in relation to required electrical loads so that an acceptable adequacy of standby supply may be determined for each circumstance.

Following completion of the power study the Minister of Industry will submit findings to the provinces to determine what actions might be taken by them.

The National Energy Board will continue its analysis of the causes of the power failure and recommend action which might be taken to avoid a recurrence.▲

'NO PUBLIC CLAMOR' BUT SUPPORT FOR CD, SCIENTIST SAYS

A university of Pittsburgh sociologist recently summarized some of the social science research done in the civil defense area.

Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa, speaking in Washington to 275 faculty members from various schools of architecture and engineering presented his point of view on broad aspects of the problem. The latter part of his talk, a section dealing with "some research conclusions about public attitudes toward civil defense" has been extracted.

Dr. Nehnevajsa's conclusions are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

Want CD

"From 1950 until the present time, we find that civil defense programs tend to be evaluated quite favorably by our general population. Americans claim that they want civil defense; and they argue that they want more of a program than that which, at any given point, might be in operation.

"Faced with community alternatives such as slum-clearance, programs to fight juvenile delinquency, anti-Communist measures, the respondents tend to assign a low priority to civil defense programs in contrast with many alternatives such as these as well as programs concerning civil rights.

"Programs for sheltering school children tend to be almost universally approved . . .

Opinion Shift

"There has been something of a shift in public acceptance of public versus private sheltering facilities. By 1964 and quite likely today, public shelters tend to be preferred over family shelters and most respondents would actually like to see a mix of public and private shelters with an emphasis on public ones.

"Some 2 per cent of Americans in nation-wide samples claim that they have family shelters now available; and generally another two or so per cent claim that they might construct one in the near future.

"Some 25 per cent of our countrymen claim that they have taken some steps in their homes to be protected against thermonuclear war but we cannot tell which specific steps have been taken and how effective they might be.

Defenses Adequate

"Most people are convinced that our active defenses are quite adequate, and many believe that we have even adequate defenses against enemy ballistic missiles. But, at the same time, they favor programs of civil defense.

"Our public greatly overestimates the current costs of civil defense. At the same time, the respondents say that the nation ought to be spening much more on civil defense than the amount which they believe the country to be actually spending!

Uninformed

"The public is quite uninformed, however, about the warning system and particularly about the relevant signals. Americans are also uninformed about the effects of nuclear weapons in that they either consistently grossly overestimate or grossly underestimate the presently known actual weapons effects.

"There is no evidence on concrete public demand for major civil defence measures. In light of other data, however, this does not seem to reflect disinterest but rather a low sense of urgency, and a sense that prospects for a major war have been declining over the past several years.

"We find no data to support the contention that favorableness to civil defense or civil defense involvement is related to personal aggressiveness or to bellicose interpretation of world affairs . . .

Know Signs

"By far most respondents who have noticed it can identify the civil defense shelter sign; a great number know of the existence of shelters in their general residential area or in their work neighborhood; however, more than one in two respondents in mid-1963 did not know anything about the then almost completed marking and stocking program as such, and only very few Americans were aware of the progress which may have been made in their community in the course of this particular program.

Similar Problems

"The fact that the public has not been clamoring for more pervasive civil defense measures, furthermore cannot be construed in any other manner than we would interpret the fact that the current poverty program did not originate with public demands, the Peace Corps was received enthusiastically but did not result from public clamor, and most voluntary associations are familiar with the difficulty with which they can rally their membership or sustain an on-going program. In no respect have the data on civil defense systems led to fundamentally different conclusions than similar problems concernng other programs."▲

PRESS RELEASE

The Canada Emergency Measures Organization recently announced the appointment by the Civil Service Commission of Mr. Armand F. Wiggelsworth, 48, of Halifax, as Regional Director, Canada Emergency Measures Organization, in the Province of Nova Scotia.

Prior to his new appointment, Mr. Wiggelsworth was General Manager of the Nova Scotia Water Authority and Chairman of the Pictou Area Water Commission, the Cheticamp Water Commission and the Grand Etang Water Commission.

Mr. Wiggelsworth has had wide experience in Nova Scotia civil defence and emergency measures activities. He organized Civil Defence in Liverpool, Nova Scotia, and was appointed Director in March 1957. He became Director of Civil Defence for the municipality of Queens in 1959 and during the period 1960-65 was editor for Nova Scotia's EMO Bulletin and Public Information Officer for the Nova Scotia Emergency Measures Organization.

Mr. Wiggelsworth was born in Liverpool, Nova Scotia and educated at the Liverpool Academy. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, he obtained his diploma as an electrical engineering mechanical draughtsman.

Mr. Wiggelsworth served with the RCAF between 1940-45. Between 1947 and 1965 he served with the Royal Canadian Artillery Regiment, rising to command the 14th Field Artillery Regiment in 1961.

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